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In order to ease the burden on workers during the retirement of the baby boom generation, the 1983
Social Security Reforms set payroll taxes above the level needed to pay current benefits, thus
partially prefunding the baby boomers' retirement. The military and civil service retirement programs
followed suit in the mid-1980s and switched from pay-as-you-go financing to funded systems. The
excess income generated by these retirement programs was held in the federal trust funds, which
have accumulated almost $3 trillion since the reforms took place. However, this paper presents
evidence that the trust fund build-up may not help future generations due to the adoption of the
Unified Budget in 1970. The Unified Budget includes trust fund receipts as income and trust fund
payments as expenditures. The empirical evidence suggests that attempts to balance the Unified
Budget while the trust funds were generating surpluses has led to increased government spending
and personal and corporation income tax cuts within the rest of the federal government. There is no
evidence of increased government saving as a result of the trust fund accumulations. An alternate
theory of increased national saving is also explored, where increased payroll taxes accompanied by
decreased income taxes induces higher personal saving. This mechanism, suggested by Diamond,











Has the Unified Budget Undermined the Federal Government Trust Funds? 





The 1983 Social Security Reforms (sometimes referred to as the Greenspan Commission 
reforms) were the most sweeping in the almost 70 year history of the system.  They were 
made under the threat of an almost immediate inability to pay full benefits to Social Security 
recipients (Schieber and Shoven, 1999).  One of the key elements of the 1983 reforms 
involved setting the Social Security payroll tax rates above the level required to pay current 
benefits.  That is, the Greenspan Commission’s plan was for Social Security to depart from 
pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) financing and to partially prefund the retirement costs of the baby 
boom generation.  The idea was to offer some relief to the workers in the 2015 to 2050 period 
in supporting the enormous retired population forecast for that period.   By forcing workers in 
1984-2015 to pay higher payroll taxes than required to finance current retirement benefits, the 
hope was that workers in the 2016-2050 era could pay lower than PAYGO taxes.  The trust 
fund buildup and subsequent spend down would spread the burden of the retirements of baby 
boomers over 65 years rather than 30 years and somewhat even out the tax burden faced by 
different generations of workers.   
While Social Security represents the largest federal trust fund (the retirement and 
disability programs combined were estimated to hold $1.63 trillion in assets at the end of 
fiscal 2004), the federal government also maintains trust funds for Medicare, unemployment 
insurance, civil service and military retirement, and transportation.  The reform of Social 
Security financing during the 1980s was accompanied by a move towards funding the military 
and civil service retirement programs as well, again with the intent to relieve the tax burden   3
on future generations.  Overall, the annual surplus across all trust funds increased, in constant 
2000 dollars, from $16.6 billion in 1980 to $147.9 billion in 1990.  Clearly, the 1980s were a 
decade of change with respect to the operation of federal government trust funds.  The biggest 
ones went from PAYGO financing to full or partial funding.  As a result of the sustained 
surpluses of the trust funds, they accumulated almost $3 trillion in assets between 1985 and 
2004. 
Despite this success in building up the assets of the trust funds, it is not at all obvious 
that the intended intergenerational burden sharing will take place.  In order for the trust funds 
to actually assist future generations of workers, they must increase national saving, 
presumably by raising government saving.   The only way to assist future workers is to leave 
them more wealth.  However, current federal budget policies treat the surplus of trust fund 
revenues over expenditures, and the interest received by the trust funds, as part of the unified 
surplus.  The focus on balancing the unified surplus may serve as an invitation for the rest of 
government (referred to as the federal funds) to offset the trust fund surplus through increased 
government spending and the reduction in other taxes.  Thus, the budget process may 
undermine the attempt to raise government saving and build resources for future workers.  
Alternatively, the increased payroll tax that accompanied the attempt to partially 
prefund Social Security, and to fund the military and civil service retirement programs, 
conceivably could increase national saving without increasing government saving.  The 
mechanism for this was suggested by Diamond (2003).  If the higher than PAYGO-required 
payroll tax permitted an offsetting reduction of the personal income tax (and perhaps the 
corporation income tax); the composition of tax revenues was changed.  If the marginal 
propensity to save out of the payroll tax is low relative to the marginal propensity to save out   4
of personal income taxes, then private saving might increase as the country moved to the new 
revenue mix.  The idea is that the payroll tax is borne by relatively low income workers, at 
least in comparison to those who bear the personal income tax, and that these lower income 
workers have a marginal propensity to consume of approximately unity.  The higher payroll 
taxes might not depress saving, whereas the lower personal and corporate income taxes could 
increase it.   
This paper examines whether the shift from PAYGO to partially funded Social 
Security (and the corresponding shift in the funding of military and civil service retirement 
plans) resulted in a shift in national saving.  We know that the attempt to partially prefund 
Social Security benefits and to fund military and civil service pensions will tend to enlarge the 
unified surplus numbers ceteris peribus.  However, if the larger unified surplus projections 
permit additional government spending and tax reductions, the saving by the trust funds may 
be partially or even completely offset by reductions in federal funds saving.  We also explore 
whether larger trust fund surpluses resulted in increased personal saving through the channel 
suggested by Diamond (2003). 
Elmendorf and Liebman (2001), Smetters (2003), Burtless and Bosworth (2004), and 
Shoven (2003) examine related questions.  Our methodology is most closely related to that of 
Smetters, who empirically demonstrates that increases in the off-budget (Social Security) 
surplus tends to be associated with reductions in the on-budget (non-Social Security) surplus.  
However, the Smetters study focuses only on Social Security surpluses: the surpluses of the 
other trust funds are included in the on-budget surplus.  Burtless and Bosworth (2004) extend 
Smetters’ analysis to other developed countries, as well as to state governments.  We extend 
the analysis by examining the impact of increases in the aggregate surplus of all federal trust   5
funds on saving by the rest of the government (the federal funds).  We believe this is the 
appropriate way to address the question of whether the government’s attempts to save via the 
trust funds have been successful.  Since the assets in several trust funds were increased 
simultaneously during the 1980s, an analysis of on- and off-budget surpluses will tend to 
attribute the impact of the civilian and military retirement funds to the Social Security trust 
fund. 
Our primary result is that increases in the aggregate surplus of the trust funds are 
offset – perhaps completely – by reductions in the federal funds surplus.  In fact, using words 
that sound more familiar, the trust fund surpluses result in enlarged deficits for the rest of the 
government.  We maintain that it is the existence of a unified budget that produces this offset.  
Again confirming Smetters’ (2003) results, we show that prior to the adoption of a unified 
budget in 1970, an increase in the surplus of the trust funds did not reduce saving by the rest 
of the government.   To hammer the point home, the government appears to have had the 
ability to save before the advent of the unified budget, but has lost that ability since.  The $3 
trillion of assets in the trust funds represent the cumulated surpluses of their operations with 
interest.  However, the money has been spent or returned to taxpayers and not saved, at least 
not by the federal government. 
We also do not find empirical support for the Diamond hypothesis that increasing the 
payroll tax to build up the trust fund results in increased personal saving.  While we believe 
that this argument is theoretically sound, we conclude that the effect is empirically negligible.  
Thus, efforts to build up the trust funds are at least partially offset (and quite likely completely 
offset) by reductions in government saving elsewhere, while having no discernable effect on 
personal saving.   6
One implication of this argument is discussed by Bosworth and Burtless (2004): if the 
government is unable to increase saving by building up its trust funds, then a system of 
individual accounts for Social Security – rather than centralized investment of the trust fund 
in equities – is more likely to produce an increase in national saving (since individual 
accounts would not be included in the federal budget).  However, our analysis suggests that 
individual accounts are not necessary to remedy the situation.  All that is required is a shift in 
emphasis to the federal funds surplus as a measure of the government budget balance.  This 
number is already calculated and reported; however, attempts to balance “the budget” have 
focused almost exclusively on the unified surplus. 
This paper is organized as follows.  Section II describes the history behind the 
adoption of the unified budget.  Section III presents our econometric model and results 
pertaining to government saving.  Section IV presents our empirical analysis of the 
relationship between trust fund surpluses and personal saving.  Section V concludes. 
 
II.  The Unified Budget: A Historical Perspective 
The unified budget was adopted in 1970 based on the recommendation of the 1967 
President’s Commission on Budget Concepts.  The idea underlying the Commission’s 
recommendation was that the unified budget provides the best measure of the macroeconomic 
impact of the public sector.  Prior to 1970, three different measures of the budget surplus 
existed.  One measure came from the National Income Accounts.  The other two measures 
were derived from the administrative budget (which excluded the trust funds) and the 
consolidated cash budget (which included the trust funds).  Fiscal policy tended to focus on 
the administrative budget.   7
The goal of the President’s Commission was to reconcile these various measures and 
arrive at an appropriate definition of the budget.  Regarding the trust funds, the Commission 
argued: “The surplus or deficit in the administrative budget is a misleading guide for 
measuring the fiscal impact of the budget on the economy.” (President’s Commission 1967, p. 
27)  Thus, the Commission strongly recommended the use of a unified budget.  Since 1970 
the main policy focus has been on the unified budget surplus (Elmendorf and Liebman 2000), 
although federal funds surplus figures are also computed and published.  The federal funds 
numbers tend to be buried in the fine print of the massive budget documents.  
Prior to the 1980s, the important trust funds operated largely on a PAYGO basis.  As a 
result, during this period, the choice of surplus measure – unified or federal funds - did not 
matter much.  However, a $200 billion per year gap between the federal funds and unified 
surplus measures has opened up since 1985 – that is, the annual federal funds deficit is now 
roughly $200 billion larger than the unified deficit commonly emphasized (Shoven 2003).  A 
widespread belief – based on the unified budget figures – is that the government ran large 
surpluses in 1998-2001.  However, the federal funds budget has consistently run deficits since 
1969 (the single exception being a very small – $1.8 billion – surplus in 2000).  Thus, the 
large surpluses of 1998-2001 were a result of federal funds deficits being hidden by the trust 
funds surpluses. 
Conventional economic wisdom suggests that the government should attempt to 
balance the budget at full-employment.  Attempts to implement this approach have tended to 
focus on the unified budget.  For example, the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, which 
attempted to force a reduction in the federal deficit during the 1980s, established targets for   8
the unified budget only.  Moreover, in public debate, references to “the surplus” typically 
mean the unified surplus.  For example, according to a CNN story published in 2000: 
The federal budget surplus for fiscal year 1999 was $122.7 billion and $69.2 billion 
for fiscal year 1998. Those back-to-back surpluses, the first since 1957, allowed the 
Treasury to pay down $138 billion in national debt (Wallace 2000).  
 
More accurately, however, the total federal debt did not fall in either 1998 or 1999.  The 
publicly held debt fell because the government was using the trust funds surpluses to finance 
its operations.  This resulted in an increase in debt held by the trust funds, which more than 
offset the reduction in the publicly held debt.  Which is the correct measure of the federal 
debt?  As discussed by Shoven (2003), if the trust fund assets are to be viewed as “real” assets 
in any meaningful sense, then government debt held in the trust funds represents a real 
liability for taxpayers.  That is, from an accounting perspective, the trust funds cannot be 
treated as assets by the programs they finance unless a corresponding liability is 
acknowledged.  The unified surplus fails to acknowledge such a liability by treating the trust 
funds’ net income as money that is available to spend on other programs or rebate to 
taxpayers. 
In addition to its recommendation of a unified budget, the Commission also 
emphasized the importance of issuing separate reports of the trust fund finances side-by-side 
with the unified budget: 
In many instances, in fact, [the Commission] sees merit in earmarking specific 
revenue sources for well-defined programs of a long-run character.  The need to 
respect the integrity of trust funds, and the requirements of control and accountability, 
in turn require the continued availability of trust fund receipt and expenditure figures 
separate from those of other funds. (President’s Commission 1967, p. 27) 
 
Thus, the Commission allowed for the continued earmarking of funds for Social Security and 
other programs.  An important question is whether such earmarking matters in any real sense.     9
Earmarked funds can be spent by the Treasury without explicit authorization (CBO 2002).  In 
a political economy framework, the earmarking of funds does matter (see, e.g., Bos 2000, 
Marsiliani and Renstrom 2000), and we would certainly expect the buildup of the trust funds 
to have real effects on the government’s spending priorities.  However, the question with 
which this paper is concerned is whether, in the aggregate, the trust funds can be used as a 
vehicle for government saving; if so, then the buildup in the trust funds during the 1980s can 
achieve its purpose of relieving the burden on future generations.   
Smetters (2003) provides a useful summary of the various perspectives on this issue 
with regard to the Social Security trust fund.  The key criterion for determining whether the 
trust funds represent a real government asset is whether an increase in the trust funds results 
in a lower level of publicly held debt than there would have been otherwise.  If so, they 
represent real saving.  Smetters finds empirical support for the perspective that the focus on 
the unified budget invites the government to increase its non-Social Security spending 
whenever the Social Security surplus increases.   
We agree with this perspective, and we extend Smetters’ analysis to include all the 
trust funds.  Attempts to save in the trust funds treat the trust funds as real government assets.  
But this is inconsistent with the use of a unified budget because the unified surplus treats the 
trust funds surplus as money that is currently available to spend, rather than money that has 
been earmarked for saving.  The picture that emerges from our empirical analysis is that the 
trust funds surpluses during the 1980s gave the government more flexibility to increase other 
spending and cut taxes while still meeting Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, or other unified budget 
deficit targets.  In other words, when the government focuses on balancing the unified budget, 
attempts to save in the trust funds are undermined.  The higher than necessary payroll taxes   10
permit more spending and lower rates on other taxes, but they do not make future generations 
wealthier. 
 
III.  Econometric Analysis 
We use macroeconomic time-series data from 1949-2003 to estimate the relationship between 
the surpluses in the trust funds and federal funds.  Our dataset excludes the transition quarter 
in 1976-77 when the government changed the fiscal year.  Our current-dollar trust fund and 
federal funds surplus data come from Historical Table 1.4 of the FY 2005 Budget of the U.S. 
Government; we convert these into constant (2000) dollars using the GDP deflator.  Figure 1 
shows the real trust funds and federal funds surpluses from 1949 through 2009, with the 2004-
09 figures being the OMB projections from the 2005 U.S. Budget.  It is clear from the figure 
that increasing trust fund surpluses during the 1980s were accompanied by larger federal 
funds deficits.   
In order to determine whether this relationship holds up under formal econometric 
analysis, we estimate the following equation: 
t t t t X TFSURP FFSURP ε γ β α + ⋅ + ⋅ + =  
where 
t FFSURP  = Real Federal Funds surplus in year t 
t TFSURP= Real Trust Fund surplus in year t. 
t X = a vector of control variables. 
t ε = an independent, identically distributed error term. 
In the regressions, we consider two alternative specifications of TFSURP and 
FFSURP.  First, we use the standard surplus measures discussed above and depicted in Figure   11
1.  The standard measures count as trust fund revenue interest credited on the special-issue 
government bonds held in the trust fund.  The interest is paid by simply issuing more bonds to 
the trust funds.  These interest payments are treated as an expenditure in computing the 
federal funds surplus.  However, as discussed by Smetters (2003), this treatment of interest 
payments may not be appropriate.  The underlying theory suggests that if the trust funds earn 
additional income from an excess of contributions over expenditures, this income is then 
spent by the rest of the government.  This argument does not, however, apply to interest 
income the trust funds receive from the rest of the government.  To address this issue, we 
proceed analogously to Smetters and construct “modified” trust funds and federal funds 
surpluses.  The modified trust funds surplus is computed by subtracting interest received on 
trust fund assets from our previous measure of the trust funds surplus; these interest payments 
are then added to our previous measure of the federal funds surplus to obtain the modified 
federal funds surplus.
1  Both surplus measures are divided by real potential GDP in order to 
reduce the possibility of heteroscedasticity. 
The coefficient of interest isβ .  If β  is close to 0, this suggests that the government’s 
attempts to save in the trust funds have been successful: an increase in trust fund saving does 
not affect saving by the rest of the government.  On the other hand, if β  is negative, an 
increase in trust fund saving is offset by dissaving by the rest of the government; in particular, 
if 1 − = β , then an increase in trust fund saving has no impact on overall government saving.  
This econometric model is analogous to that of Smetters (2003), who estimates the 
relationship between the surplus in the Social Security trust fund and the surplus in the rest of 
the budget (including the other trust funds). 
                                                           
1 The interest payment data were provided by Bob Kilpatrick of the Office of Management and Budget on May   12
Our control variables include the ratio of actual to potential GDP, the ratios of real 
capped and uncapped wages to potential GDP, the nominal interest rate paid on the special-
issue Treasury bonds held by the Social Security trust fund, and a quadratic time trend.  Our 
potential GDP data come from January 2004 Congressional Budget Office calculations, and 
take into account factors such as the potential labor force and potential total factor 
productivity.  The potential GDP measure is adjusted for inflation using a factor provided by 
the CBO; the actual GDP measure is adjusted for inflation using the GDP deflator.  The ratio 
controls for the fact that business cycle fluctuations are likely to have an impact on both the 
federal funds and the trust funds surpluses. 
The capped wage measure comes from the Social Security Administrations’ Annual 
Statistical Supplement (Table 4.B1), and the uncapped wage measure from the National 
Income and Product Accounts (Table 2.1).  We adjust both measures for inflation using the 
GDP deflator.  Capped wages are not available for 1949 and 2003, so we impute these 
amounts by assuming that the ratio of capped to uncapped wages was the same as in the 
adjacent year.  These two variables are intended to capture the impact of a mean-preserving 
spread in wages on Social Security payroll tax receipts.  Since the payroll tax is regressive, a 
mean-preserving spread in wages is likely to reduce the trust funds surplus by lowering 
payroll tax revenue; it is also likely to increase the federal funds surplus through the 
progressive income tax.  Therefore, omitting these two variables might lead to a downward 
bias in the estimate ofβ . 
The nominal special-issue interest rate data are from the Social Security 
Administration.  In each year, this variable is computed as the average of the 12 monthly 
interest rates on new issues during the year.  Including this variable is important for the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
25, 2004.   13
specifications that use the standard surplus measure.  Because interest payments flow from the 
federal funds to the trust funds, an increase in the nominal interest rate will increase the 
standard measure of the trust funds surplus and reduce the standard measure of the federal 
funds surplus.  Therefore, the omission of this variable will tend to bias β  downwards.  Since 
this issue does not arise with the modified surplus measures, the interest rate variable is not 
included in these specifications.
 2 
For each specification, we test for heteroscedasticity using the Breush-Pagan score test 
against multiplicative heteroscedasticity.  We also test for serial correlation in the error terms 
using Durbin’s alternative test, in which the residuals from the original regression are 
regressed on their lagged values (up to three lags) and all the independent variables.  The p-
value for each of these tests (against the null hypothesis of no serial correlation or 
heteroscedasticity) is reported in the results table for each specification.  Our tests indicate 
evidence of heteroscedasticity and first or second order serial correlation in several of the 
specifications.  The reader should note, however, that our test for heteroscedasticity is not 
robust to the presence of serial correlation; thus, the heteroscedasticity test results may not be 
valid for the specifications in which serial correlation is present.  On the other hand, our serial 
correlation test results are robust to heteroscedasticity because we use a heteroscedasticity-
robust estimate of the variance-covariance matrix for the test equations.
3  To address the 
potential presence of heteroscedasticity and serial correlation, we report Newey-West 
standard errors with a lag of two periods.
4   
                                                           
2 We thank Peter Orszag for suggesting the last two points about the capped and uncapped wages, and the 
nominal interest rate. 
3 See Wooldridge 2002, Chapter 12, for a discussion of this issue.  
4 One guideline for determining the lag for computing Newey-West standard errors is the integer portion of  4
1
n , 
where n is the sample size (see Wooldrige 2002, p. 397).  In our case, this guideline implies a lag of two 
periods.   14
Our baseline results are reported in Table 1.  In all of our specifications, the coefficient 
on the trust funds surplus variable is negative and statistically significant at the 5 percent 
level.  Adding covered and uncovered wages does lower the magnitude of the coefficient, but 
by a relatively small amount.  The coefficient on the nominal interest rate is positive 
(unexpectedly) but not statistically significant; its inclusion barely changes the coefficient on 
the trust funds surplus.  Our preferred specifications are the ones that include the full set of 
controls (the last two columns in the table); even though the interest rate coefficient has an 
unexpected sign and is not statistically significant, we believe that theory strongly supports its 
inclusion in the standard surplus measure regression.  These specifications suggest that a $1 
increase in the trust funds surplus reduces the federal funds surplus by $1.54 (for the standard 
measures) or $1.44 (for the modified measures).  Both estimates are significantly different 
from zero and not significantly different from 1.  A 95 percent confidence interval for the 
magnitude of the coefficient is .56 to 2.53 for the standard measures and .49 and 2.41 for the 
modified measures.  Even the lower end of both confidence intervals implies an offset that is 
economically significant.  Thus, our results suggest that an increase in government saving via 
the trust funds is at least partially – and perhaps completely – offset by a decrease in 
government saving outside of the trust funds. 
It is worth mentioning that our point estimates of the coefficient on the trust fund 
variable differ considerably from those obtained by Smetters (2003).  Smetters estimates that 
a $1 increase in the Social Security surplus reduces the on-budget surplus by $2.76; this 
estimate is statistically greater than 1, implying that an increase in off-budget saving actually 
reduces overall government saving.  A possible explanation for this difference is that the 
government attempted to build up several trust funds simultaneously during the 1980s.  Thus,   15
the coefficient of the off-budget surplus is likely to pick up some of the impact of the other 
trust funds. 
As discussed above, the unified budget was adopted in 1970.  We have argued that it 
is the focus on balancing the unified budget that gives rise to the government’s inability to 
save in the trust funds.  Thus, it is reasonable to split our time series into two periods – 1949-
1969 and 1970-2003 – and re-run our regressions.  Theory predicts that the coefficient of the 
trust funds surplus variable should be close to zero prior to the adoption of the unified budget 
and negative afterwards.  The split-sample regression results are reported in tables 2 and 3.   
As can be seen from Tables 2 and 3, the estimate of β  over the 1970-2003 period is 
negative and statistically significant; in this case, it is also significantly greater than 1 in 
magnitude.  However, in the pre-1970 period, the point estimates of β  are not significantly 
different from zero.  This confirms our argument that the adoption of the unified surplus is the 
factor that hinders the government’s ability to save in the trust funds.  Smetters (2003) finds 
the same qualitative result (no relationship pre-1970 and an inverse relationship post-1970) 
for the on- and off-budget surpluses.  
Overall, our results suggest that government saving has not increased despite the 
almost $3 trillion accumulated in trust funds since 1985.  Future generations may have lower 
payroll taxes than they otherwise would have, but they will not have more resources.  They 
themselves will have to finance their lower payroll taxes with higher income taxes (or lower 
government spending).  The intergenerational burden sharing envisioned by the Greenspan 
Commission has been thwarted. 
Similar results emerge from cross country analysis.  Bosworth and Burtless (2004) 
estimate similar regressions for OECD countries and show that increases in Social Security   16
trust fund surpluses are at least partially offset by reduced surpluses in the rest of the 
government.  Since these countries use unified budgets, this result is as expected.   Bosworth 
and Burtless also show that at the state level in the U.S., surpluses in employees’ retirement 
trust funds are not offset by reductions in saving by the rest of the government.  One 
explanation they propose is that, unlike national governments, state governments use a system 
of accrual accounting under which pension funds are kept separate from the rest of the budget. 
The issue regarding whether the unified budget affected the legitimacy of the trust 
funds can be looked at another way.  Consider a counterfactual situation where the excess 
payroll tax receipts were used to fund individual accounts rather than to purchase government 
bonds.  In fact, to make the two cases almost identical, consider what would happen if the 
individual accounts were 100% invested in U.S. government bonds.  At first glance, the 
money available to the rest of the government would be unchanged.  However, the funding of 
individual accounts would almost certainly be treated as an expense.  The interest payments 
on the government bonds in the individual accounts would also be treated as an expense.  The 
budget surplus would be lower by the amount of the cash flow surplus in social security and 
the other trust funds (the new deposits into accounts) and the interest payments received on 
existing bonds.  That is, the surplus would have switched from what we now calculate as the 
unified surplus to the much lower federal funds surplus.  The saving in individual accounts 
would not be treated as part of the surplus and thus less likely spent by the rest of government.  
However, this accounting change could be adopted without individual accounts; what would 
be required is separating the trust fund accounts from the rest of the budget and reporting the 
federal funds budget as the primary assessment of the government budget and the target for 
balancing at full employment.   17
 
IV.  Trust Fund Accumulations and Personal Saving  
  As discussed above, an increase in the trust funds surplus can raise national saving by 
raising personal saving (Diamond 2003).  According to this argument, increases in the 
(regressive) payroll tax disproportionately affect low-income individuals, who tend to be 
liquidity constrained.  To the extent that the resulting trust funds surpluses are used to finance 
income or other tax cuts, which disproportionately affect non-liquidity higher-income 
individuals, they will tend to raise personal saving.  This follows from the fact that higher-
income individuals – who tend not to be liquidity constrained – have a higher marginal 
propensity to save out of disposable income than the liquidity-constrained poor.  Historically, 
most of the increases in the trust funds have resulted from increases in the payroll tax.  Thus, 
to test for the “Diamond effect,” we regress the National Income and Product Accounts 
measure of personal saving on the trust funds surpluses and our other macroeconomic control 
variables.  The results from various specifications of this regression are reported in Table 4.      
The specifications that include all the controls suggest that a $1 increase in the trust 
funds surplus may increase personal saving by between 56 and 66 cents.  However, the 
relevant coefficient is only statistically significant at the 5 percent level when using the 
modified trust funds surplus measure.  Given the sensitivity of the coefficient estimate across 
our specifications, we conclude that we do not see strong evidence for the economic 
significance of the Diamond effect. 
   18
V.  Conclusions 
The issues that this paper deals with are clearly important.   The primary issue is 
whether the assets in the federal trust funds will help future generations of workers finance the 
retirements of the baby boom generation.  Has the governmental policy of building up these 
trust funds succeeded in transferring resources to the next generation of workers?  
Unfortunately, the evidence of this paper suggests that the answer is “no.”  Our empirical 
analysis is consistent with the idea that the focus on the unified federal budget has 
undermined the wealth accumulation aspect of the trust funds.  The surplus revenues that the 
trust funds have turned over to the rest of the government have been spent and not saved.  As 
a result, no extra wealth has been accumulated. 
If the focus had been on balancing the federal funds budget instead of the unified 
budget and if the government had been equally successful with that balancing, the total debt 
of the government and the publicly held debt would have been $3 trillion lower.  Future 
generations would have been $3 trillion wealthier and the vision of the Greenspan 
Commission would have been at least partially fulfilled.  Of course, the focusing on the 
federal funds budget would have revealed a number of things.  First, the large surpluses that 
we enjoyed in 1998-2000 never really existed, at least according to the federal funds accounts. 
Second, the 2004 budget deficit is roughly $200 billion higher than reported and, third, the tax 
cuts, which may have been necessary for business cycle reasons, were not merely a rebate of 
sizable surpluses.   
There is considerable debate as to whether the crisis in the financing of Social Security 
occurs in roughly 2017 when payroll tax receipts are insufficient to finance benefits or in the 
2040s when the Social Security trust funds are projected to be exhausted.  From the   19
perspective of Social Security, the trust fund does represent real claims on the rest of the 
government.  Thus, the presence of the trust fund may prolong the life of Social Security 
beyond the date at which tax receipts fall short of benefits payments.  However, from the 
perspective of future generations of workers, the trust funds do not represent incremental 
wealth.  Even if Social Security’s life is lengthened, workers 15 years from now will have to 
pay off the obligations in the trust fund through increases in other taxes and cuts in other 
government services.  The trust funds themselves do not provide any assistance to future 
generations of workers in coping with the inadequate income of Social Security to pay the 
legislated benefits.    20
Figure 1: Real Trust Funds and Federal Funds Surpluses, 1949-2003 
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Table 1: 1949-2003 














Trust Funds Surplus/Potential 
GDP  -1.650708* -1.520736**  -1.540859**     
   (0.645716)  (0.4833785)  (0.4924833)    
Federal Funds Surplus/Potential 
GDP      -1.449048** 
       (0.4781959) 
Actual GDP/Potential GDP  421810.9*  95078.88  96250.05  77641.44 
   (119308.7)  (119527.8)  (123453)  (119799.5) 
Time -1470.972  -1629.087*  -1743.347*  -1583.976* 
   (841.8928)  (618.0936)  (779.6546)  (621.5221) 
Time^2 25.01498  39.56508**  41.58506**  36.42577** 
   (15.31796)  (12.46778)  (15.16207)  (11.3311) 
Interest Rate  -1374.467    258.1946    
   (1321.308)    (1252.786)    
Capped wages/Potential GDP    -0.128378 -0.1335191 -0.1202016 
     (0.0956467) (0.1053793) (0.0974718) 
Uncapped wages/Potential GDP    0.5617317** 0.5741988** 0.5628737** 
     (0.1513119) (0.1646369) (0.1532765) 
Test for heteroscedasticity p-
value 0.9326  0.0257  0.0202  0.0172 
Test for serial correlation p-value      
lag 1  0.0001  0.0395  0.0414  0.0283 
lag 2  0.0004  0.0924  0.0898  0.0691 
lag 3  0.0013  0.1917  0.1834  0.1521 
Notes: - Newey-West standard errors in parentheses.  Test for heteroscedasticity is a Breush-Pagan 
score test against multiplicative heteroscedasticity.  The null hypothesis is that there is no heteroscedasticity.  
Test for serial correlation is Durbin's alternative test, using a heteroscedasticity-robust variance-covariance 
matrix.  Newey-West standard errors were computed with a maximum lag of 2.  
* coefficient is significant at 5% level. 
**coefficient is significant at 1% level.   22
Table 2: 1949-1967 














Trust Funds Surplus/Potential GDP  0.4762558  0.6494631  0.338383    
   (0.5976038)  (0.8911761)  (0.8142253)    
Federal Funds Surplus/Potential GDP        0.6748133 
         (0.8611485) 
Actual GDP/Potential GDP  -27452.93  -13782.75  73954.12  -22684.53 
   (129237.9)  (219962.2)  (280503.6)  (219071) 
Time 1960.046  1239.053  1779.007  1026.302 
   (1815.767)  (2300.472)  (3293.658)  (2243.389) 
Time^2 -155.4926  -72.47725  -166.4758  -64.66157 
   (182.0831)  (99.49348)  (261.6895)  (97.58771) 
Interest Rate  5911.992    7778.415    
   (11093.36)    (14544.61)    
Capped wages/Potential GDP    0.0385832  0.0302854  0.0449398 
     (0.1513472)  (0.177708)  (0.1496206) 
Uncapped wages/Potential GDP    -0.1006482  -0.1680977  -0.0925399 
     (0.2259064)  (0.2075103)  (0.227387) 
Test for heteroscedasticity p-value  0.6833  0.7422  0.8941  0.7998 
Test for serial correlation p-value         
lag 1  0.9623  0.9975  0.9084  0.9841 
lag 2  0.3596  0.1718  0.3148  0.1871 
lag 3  0.4466  0.2577  0.3703  0.2768 
Notes: - Newey-West standard errors in parentheses.   Test for heteroscedasticity is a Breush-Pagan 
score test against multiplicative heteroscedasticity.  The null hypothesis is that there is no heteroscedasticity.  
Test for serial correlation is Durbin's alternative test, using a heteroscedasticity-robust variance-covariance 
matrix.  Newey-West standard errors were computed with a maximum lag of 2.  
* coefficient is significant at 5% level. 
**coefficient is significant at 1% level.   23
Table 3: 1970-2003 














Trust Funds Surplus/Potential GDP  -1.623613**  -2.655043**  -2.489442**    
   (0.3945328)  (0.5525029)  (0.5306096)    
Federal Funds Surplus/Potential GDP        -2.638166** 
         (0.5961577) 
Actual GDP/Potential GDP  645590.6**  -11385.08  60404.19  -38719.12 
   (133865.5)  (196831.2)  (200718.3)  (215132.4) 
Time -4885.127**  5114.534  3937.988  4170.21 
   (969.9858)  (3751.219)  (3768.125)  (3685.005) 
Time^2 152.8868**  -55.64747  -23.93927  -49.50229 
   (35.28818)  (79.72444)  (82.44289)  (80.96773) 
Interest Rate  2749.455*    1789.616    
   (1234.591)    (1026.517)    
Capped wages/Potential GDP    -0.1661152  -0.2509594  -0.0251418 
     (0.2383496)  (0.2412)  (0.2159299) 
Uncapped wages/Potential GDP    1.266665*  1.235645*  1.169058* 
     (0.5002556)  (0.4893056)  (0.4959667) 
Test for heteroscedasticity p-value  0.3891  0.4208  0.7019  0.4904 
Test for serial correlation p-value         
lag  1  0.004 0.4577  0.524 0.2023 
lag 2  0.0041  0.7622  0.7648  0.4472 
lag 3  0.0077  0.4488  0.6263  0.2834 
Notes: - Newey-West standard errors in parentheses.   Test for heteroscedasticity is a Breush-Pagan 
score test against multiplicative heteroscedasticity.  The null hypothesis is that there is no heteroscedasticity.  
Test for serial correlation is Durbin's alternative test, using a heteroscedasticity-robust variance-covariance 
matrix.  Newey-West standard errors were computed with a maximum lag of 2.  
* coefficient is significant at 5% level. 
**coefficient is significant at 1% level.   24
Table 4: Personal Savings Regressions, 1949-2003 






Trust Funds Surplus/Potential GDP  0.5585641   
   (0.3244104)   
Modified Trust Funds Surplus/Potential GDP    0.6639009* 
   (0.3302471) 
Actual GDP/Potential GDP  -115664.4*  -121951.2** 
   (43614.97)  (44665.99) 
Time 2671.236**  2578.569** 
   (320.3621)  (335.4773) 
Time^2 -59.92853**  -56.13543** 
   (4.775007)  (5.104399) 
Test for heteroscedasticity p-value  0.3337  0.3240 
Test for serial correlation p-value     
lag 1 0.0013  0.0038 
lag 2 0.0027  0.0073 
lag 3 0.0074  0.0184 
Notes: - Newey-West standard errors in parentheses.  OLS standard errors in brackets.  Test for 
heteroscedasticity is a Breush-Pagan score test against multiplicative heteroscedasticity.  The null hypothesis is 
that there is no heteroscedasticity.  Test for serial correlation is Durbin's alternative test, using a 
heteroscedasticity-robust variance-covariance matrix.  Newey-West standard errors were computed with a 
maximum lag of 2.  
* coefficient is significant at 5% (using Newey-West standard errors). 
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